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The basic element in any sustainable dam project is safety, which includes the following safety elements: 
① structural safety, ② dam safety monitoring, ③ operational safety and maintenance, and ④ emergency 
planning. Long-term safety primarily includes the analysis of all hazards affecting the project; that is, 
hazards from the natural environment, hazards from the man-made environment, and project-specific 
and site-specific hazards. The special features of the seismic safety of dams are discussed. Large dams 
were the first structures to be systematically designed against earthquakes, starting in the 1930s. How-
ever, the seismic safety of older dams is unknown, as most were designed using seismic design criteria 
and methods of dynamic analysis that are considered obsolete today. Therefore, we need to reevaluate 
the seismic safety of existing dams based on current state-of-the-art practices and rehabilitate deficient 
dams. For large dams, a site-specific seismic hazard analysis is usually recommended. Today, large dams 
and the safety-relevant elements used for controlling the reservoir after a strong earthquake must be 
able to withstand the ground motions of a safety evaluation earthquake. The ground motion parameters 
can be determined either by a probabilistic or a deterministic seismic hazard analysis. During strong 
earthquakes, inelastic deformations may occur in a dam; therefore, the seismic analysis has to be car-
ried out in the time domain. Furthermore, earthquakes create multiple seismic hazards for dams such 
as ground shaking, fault movements, mass movements, and others. The ground motions needed by the 
dam engineer are not real earthquake ground motions but models of the ground motion, which allow 
the safe design of dams. It must also be kept in mind that dam safety evaluations must be carried out 
several times during the long life of large storage dams. These features are discussed in this paper. 
© 2016 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
The basic element in any sustainable structure or infrastruc-
ture project is safety. Therefore, for sustainable storage dams, 
the emphasis must be on the long-term safety of the dam. Today, 
dam safety requires an integral safety concept, which comprises 
the following elements:
•	Structural safety;
•	Dam safety monitoring;
•	Operational safety and maintenance; and
•	Emergency planning.
Long-term safety primarily includes the analysis of all hazards 
affecting the project; that is, hazards from the natural environ-
ment, hazards from the man-made environment, and project- 
specific and site-specific hazards. This paper discusses the special 
features of the seismic safety of dams, as the structural safety of 
large storage dams today is often governed by the earthquake 
load case.
For large dam projects, a site-specific seismic hazard analysis 
is usually recommended. These analyses are carried out by seis-
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mologists. It is important that the dam engineer, who is the end 
user of the results of seismic hazard analyses, clearly specifies 
what he or she needs, as seismologists are not familiar with the 
seismic safety concepts used in dam engineering. Today, large 
dams and the safety-relevant elements used for controlling the 
reservoir after a strong earthquake (such as the gates of gated 
spillways and the gates of bottom outlets) must be able to with-
stand the ground motions of the safety evaluation earthquake 
(SEE). The SEE ground motion parameters can be determined 
either by a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) or by a 
deterministic analysis in which worst-case earthquake scenarios 
are considered. During the SEE, inelastic deformations may oc-
cur in a dam; therefore, the seismic analysis must be carried out 
in the time domain. In general, seismologists provide response 
spectra or uniform hazard spectra as the result of their seismic 
hazard studies, but acceleration time histories are needed for the 
inelastic analysis of large dams. In addition, earthquakes create 
multiple seismic hazards for dams such as ground shaking, fault 
movements, mass movements, and other project-specific and 
site-specific hazards. Reservoir-triggered seismicity (RTS) may 
also have to be considered. 
The ground motions needed by the dam engineer—that is, 
mainly the acceleration time histories—are not real earthquake 
ground motions but models of the ground motion, which allow 
the safe design of dams. 
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that dam safety evalua-
tions have to be carried out several times during the long life of 
large storage dams. 
The state-of-practice in the seismic analysis and design of dams 
is documented in the bulletins and guidelines [1–5] prepared by 
the Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design of the Interna-
tional Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). These are:
•	Bulletin 112: Neotectonics and dams [1];
•	Bulletin 120: Design features of dams to effectively resist 
seismic ground motion [2];
•	Bulletin 123: Earthquake design and evaluation of structures 
appurtenant to dams [3];
•	Bulletin 137: Reservoirs and seismicity—state of knowledge 
[4]; and
•	Bulletin 148: Selecting seismic parameters for large dams [5]. 
Bulletins 112 and 137 are concerned with dams on faults and 
with RTS, respectively; that is, with special features of seismic 
hazard for dams. Bulletins 120 and 123 provide guidelines on 
seismic design concepts and constructional features for the seis-
mic design of a dam, which will perform satisfactorily during 
strong earthquakes. Bulletin 148 provides updated seismic design 
guidelines for dams, safety-relevant elements, and appurtenant 
structures.
The safety-relevant elements are spillway gates and bottom 
outlets, which must function after an earthquake in order to con-
trol the water level in the reservoir and, in the case of damage, 
to lower the reservoir so that the dam can be repaired and/or 
strengthened.
The current paper is based on publications prepared by the 
ICOLD Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design [1–5] and on 
papers published by the author [6–9]. It provides an overview of 
seismic hazard, seismic design and performance criteria, seismic 
safety of existing dams, and sustainability of large storage dams.
2. Seismic hazard 
An earthquake hazard is a multi-hazard, which includes the 
following main hazards for a large dam project [9]:
•	Ground shaking;
•	Movements along faults or discontinuities in the footprint of 
the dam and/or the reservoir;
•	Mass movements into the reservoir causing impulse waves 
and increase in reservoir level, damaging transmission lines, 
blocking access roads, and so forth; and
•	Project-specific and site-specific hazards (i.e., ground defor-
mations, seepage, liquefaction, etc.).
Ground shaking is usually considered to be the main seismic 
hazard. However, movements in the footprint of a concrete dam 
are more critical than ground shaking, as any such movements 
would, for example, cause a complicated crack pattern in highly 
statically indeterminate arch dams, which cannot be reliably 
predicted by numerical models. The dynamic behavior of the 
dam would become very complex, as cracking in the dam due to 
foundation movement and ground shaking would occur at the 
same time. Therefore, the possibility of foundation movements 
must be studied carefully. Even if no seismogenic fault crosses the 
dam foundation, a strong earthquake at a nearby fault can cause 
movements along discontinuities in the footprint of a dam. These 
discontinuities are faults, shear zones, fissures, joints, and bed-
ding planes. Such movements are hard to estimate because they 
depend on the site conditions, the distance from the seismically 
active fault, and its maximum surface movement. Some faults 
may also splay near the surface and reactivate discontinuities.
Conservatively designed earth core rockfill dams can cope with 
such movements, whereas arch dams will be very vulnerable to 
them. Therefore, if there is doubt regarding the possibility of fault 
movements, a conservatively designed earth core rockfill dam is 
the appropriate solution [1,2].
Mass movements into the reservoir would create impulse 
waves, which may overtop the dam crest. Here, concrete dams 
would be more suitable than embankment dams in order to resist 
limited overtopping. However, with an ample freeboard, a wide 
dam crest, and/or an upstream parapet or wave wall, this over-
topping hazard can be reduced or even eliminated. 
Moreover, mass movements in the reservoir region will in-
crease the sediment volume in the reservoir and may block the 
bottom outlet. However, this will usually happen in the months 
or years after an earthquake, leaving time for remedial action.
Rockfalls in mountainous regions could damage transmission 
towers, which would lead to the automatic shut-down of the 
power plant. However, a more critical issue would be rockfall 
damage of the gate control structures, equipment, emergency 
power generators, control units, and so forth needed for the op-
eration of the gates of spillways and bottom outlets. These gates 
have to be operable after a strong earthquake because it must be 
possible to control or lower the reservoir and release a moderate 
flood after a strong earthquake. Again, if these gates are blocked, 
it would lead to overtopping of the dam crest, which would be a 
much more serious safety problem for embankment dams than 
for concrete dams. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that input is needed from seis-
mologists and geologists on ① ground shaking, ② movements 
in the footprint of a dam (this is most important if a monolithic 
concrete dam is planned), and ③ critical slopes in the dam and 
reservoir region.
Usually, seismic hazard analyses are only concerned with the 
estimation of ground motion parameters such as peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) and response spectra. Ground motion param-
eters can be determined by a probabilistic and/or deterministic 
seismic hazard analysis, as discussed by Wieland [9] and ICOLD 
Bulletin 148 [5]. Accordingly, the dam body and the safety-rele-
vant elements must be able to withstand the ground motion of 
the SEE with a return period of 10 000 years (probabilistic analy-
sis) or the ground motions from worst-case earthquake scenarios 
(deterministic analysis). In the probabilistic analysis, the mean 
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values of the ground motion parameters shall be used, whereas 
in the deterministic analysis, the mean-plus-one sigma values are 
used. If both a probabilistic and deterministic analyses are done—
which is recommended—the maximum values of the ground mo-
tion parameters shall be used.
As RTS was observed in over 100 large storage dams [4], it is 
also necessary for the seismologist to address this hazard and to 
define possible scenarios, although this task is probably as diffi-
cult as earthquake prediction. RTS is generally not a dam safety 
problem, as dams are designed for the worst ground motion at 
the site. However, it may affect buildings and infrastructure pro-
jects in the dam and reservoir region that are designed for lower 
seismic hazard values than dams. Moreover, frequent noise from 
moderate magnitude events may disturb people.
3. Seismic design criteria
The following design earthquakes are needed for the seismic 
design of the different structures and elements of a large dam 
project [5,9]:
(1) Safety evaluation earthquake (SEE): The SEE is the earth-
quake ground motion a dam must be able to resist without the 
uncontrolled release of the reservoir. The SEE is the governing 
earthquake ground motion for the safety assessment and seismic 
design of the dam and safety-relevant components, which have to 
be functioning after the SEE.
(2) Design basis earthquake (DBE): The DBE, with a return pe-
riod of 475 years, is used in many countries. It is the reference de-
sign earthquake for the appurtenant structures. The DBE ground 
motion parameters are estimated based on a PSHA. The mean 
values of the ground motion parameters of the DBE can be taken. 
(Note: The return period of the DBE may be determined in ac-
cordance with the earthquake codes and regulations for buildings 
and bridges in the project region.)
(3) Operating basis earthquake (OBE): The OBE may be expect-
ed to occur during the lifetime of the dam. No damage or loss of 
service must happen. It has a probability of occurrence of about 
50% during a service life of 100 years. The return period is taken 
as 145 years [5]. The OBE ground motion parameters are estimat-
ed based on a PSHA. The mean values of the ground motion pa-
rameters of the OBE can be taken.
(4) Construction earthquake (CE): The CE is to be used for the 
design of temporary structures such as coffer dams and takes 
into account the service life of the temporary structure. There 
are different methods to calculate this design earthquake. For 
the temporary diversion facilities, a probability of exceedance of 
10% is assumed for the design life span of the diversion facilities. 
Alternatively, the return period of the CE of the diversion facilities 
may be taken as that of the design flood of the river diversion.
The SEE ground motion can be obtained from a probabilistic 
and/or a deterministic seismic hazard analysis:
(1) Maximum credible earthquake (MCE): The MCE is the event 
that produces the largest ground motion expected at the dam site 
on the basis of the seismic history and the seismotectonic setup 
in the region. It is estimated based on deterministic earthquake 
scenarios. According to ICOLD [5] the ground motion parameters 
of the MCE shall be taken as the 84 percentiles (mean-plus-one 
standard deviation).
(2) Maximum design earthquake (MDE): For large dams, the 
return period of the MDE is taken as 10 000 years. For dams with 
small or limited damage potential, shorter return periods can 
be specified. The MDE ground motion parameters are estimated 
based on a PSHA. According to ICOLD [5], the mean values of 
the ground motion parameters of the MDE shall be taken. In a 
case where a single seismic source (fault) mainly contributes to 
the seismic hazard, uniform hazard spectra can be used for the 
seismic design. Otherwise, based on the deaggregation of the 
seismic hazard (magnitude vs. focal distance), different scenario 
earthquakes may be defined.
For major dams, the SEE can be taken either as the MCE or 
MDE ground motions. Usually, the most unfavorable ground mo-
tion parameters of these two earthquakes must be taken. If it is 
not possible to make a realistic assessment of the MCE, then the 
SEE shall be at least equal to the MDE. Accordingly, there is no 
difference in performance criteria for MDE, MCE, and SEE.
MDE, DBE, OBE, and CE ground motion parameters are usually 
determined by a probabilistic approach (mean values of ground 
motion parameters are recommended), while for the MCE, ground 
motion deterministic earthquake scenarios are used (84 percen-
tile values of ground motion parameters shall be used). However, 
for the MDE, DBE, OBE, and CE, deterministic scenarios may also 
be defined.
The different design earthquakes are characterized by the fol-
lowing seismic parameters:
•	The PGA of horizontal and vertical earthquake components;
•	The acceleration response spectra of horizontal and vertical 
earthquake components, typically for 5% damping—that is, 
uniform hazard spectra for CE, OBE, DBE, and MDE, obtained 
from the PSHA (mean values), and 84 percentile values of ac-
celeration spectra for MCE, obtained from the deterministic 
analysis using different attenuation models; and
•	Spectrum-matched acceleration time histories for the hori-
zontal and vertical components of the MCE ground motion, 
determined either from a random process or by the scaling of 
recorded earthquake ground motions. The artificially gener-
ated acceleration time histories of the horizontal and vertical 
earthquake components shall be stochastically independent. 
To account for aftershocks, it is recommended to increase the 
duration of strong ground shaking.
In case of fault movements, similar estimates are required as 
for the ground shaking. It appears that it is quite difficult for the 
dam designer to obtain quantitative estimates of fault movements 
for the different types of design earthquakes because the seismic 
hazard analyses are mainly concerned with ground shaking.
For underground structures where the effects of imposed 
deformations are more relevant than inertial effects, the displace-
ment ground motion parameters or displacement time histories 
of the different design earthquakes are also needed.
The best description of the ground motion is by means of the 
acceleration time histories, which are needed for any nonlinear 
dynamic analysis of dams and components. It is also expected 
that inelastic deformations take place under the SEE ground mo-
tion. According to ICOLD [5], the following aspects of the “design 
acceleration time history” should be considered:
(1) The three components of the spectrum-matched accelera-
tion time histories must be statistically independent.
(2) The acceleration time histories of the horizontal earth-
quake components may be assumed to act in along-river and 
across-river directions. No modifications in the horizontal earth-
quake components are needed if they are applied to other direc-
tions.
(3) The duration of strong ground shaking shall be selected in 
such a way that aftershocks are also covered; that is, records with 
a long duration of strong ground shaking shall be selected.
(4) For dams that are susceptible to damage processes that 
are governed by the duration of strong ground shaking, such as 
the build-up of pore pressures, earthquake records with a long 
duration of strong ground shaking shall be used. The duration of 
strong ground shaking depends on the magnitudes of the worst-
case earthquake scenarios for a particular dam site. Empirical 
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relations or recommendations in seismic codes or guidelines may 
be used as a reference.
(5) For the safety check of a dam, at least three different earth-
quakes shall be considered for the SEE ground motion.
Recorded or synthetic acceleration time histories may be used 
as an input for spectrum-matching. Synthetic records can be ob-
tained by different methods. However, there is no real need to 
focus on this aspect for the dam design, as the spectrum-matched 
acceleration time histories with extended duration of strong 
ground shaking that are used for the seismic analysis and design 
of the dams may be quite different from real ones. Their use will, 
however, lead to a safe design, although seismologists and other 
experts who are not familiar with the seismic design of dams may 
find this difficult to understand or accept.
In this context, it should be mentioned that in the design of 
any structure, including large dams, the designer will use simpli-
fied load and analysis models that lead to a safe design, even if 
the load model does not comply with the real nature of the haz-
ard; the same applies to the earthquake hazard and earthquake 
ground motion. 
For some dams, an additional earthquake load case was de-
fined for RTS or reservoir-induced seismicity (RIS). (Note that 
the term “reservoir-induced seismicity,” which has often been 
used in the past, is incorrect because reservoirs cannot induce 
earthquakes; however, they can trigger earthquakes. Therefore, 
the correct technical term is “reservoir-triggered seismicity.”) 
RTS has been observed in over 100 reservoirs, generally with a 
water depth of over 100 m. The largest magnitudes of RTS events 
reached a value of 6.3; however, in most cases, the magnitudes of 
these shallow-focus events were much smaller. If RTS is possible 
or expected in a large dam project, then the DBE and OBE ground 
motion parameters should cover those from the assumed RTS 
scenarios, as such events are expected to occur within a few years 
after the start of the impounding of the reservoir [4].
4. Seismic performance criteria
The rather general performance criteria for the dam body and 
safety-relevant components and equipment that are given in 
Ref. [5] can be interpreted as follows [9]:
(1) Performance of the dam body during OBE: No structural 
damage (cracks, deformations, leakage, etc.) that affects the oper-
ation of the dam and the reservoir is permitted. Minor repairable 
damage is acceptable. 
(2) Performance of the dam body during SEE: Structural 
damage (cracks, deformations, leakage, etc.) is acceptable as long 
as the stability of the dam is ensured and no large quantities of 
water are released from the reservoir causing flooding in the 
downstream region of the dam.
(3) Performance of safety-relevant components and equip-
ment during and after OBE: These components and equipment 
shall be fully operable after the OBE and therefore should behave 
elastically during the OBE.
(4) Performance of safety-relevant components and equipment 
during and after the SEE: These components and equipment must 
be fully operable after the SEE. Minor distortions and damage (e.g., 
leakage of seals of gates) are acceptable as long as they have no 
impact on the proper functioning of the components and equip-
ment.
The main safety criteria for rockfill dams with an impervious 
core for the SEE are as follows:
(1) Loss of freeboard: After the earthquake, the reservoir level 
shall be below the top of the impervious core of the dam. 
(2) Internal erosion: After the earthquake, at least 50% of the 
initial thickness of the fine filter zones must be available. 
(3) Sliding safety factor of slopes: The sliding safety factor of 
slopes (considering the build-up of pore pressure and the residual 
strength parameters of embankment materials) shall be greater 
than 1 after the earthquake. 
The second criterion also applies for earth core rockfill dams 
that are located on faults or discontinuities in the dam founda-
tion, which can move during a strong earthquake. In this case, 
another dam site should preferably be selected; however, if this is 
not possible, then only a conservatively designed earth core rock-
fill dam—not a concrete dam—should be built [1].
For concrete dams, the main seismic safety criteria are as fol-
lows:
(1) Stability of the dam foundation; that is, the stability of 
wedges in the abutments of arch dams and the sliding move-
ments of gravity structures along potential sliding surfaces in the 
dam foundation must be evaluated.
(2) Sliding and overturning stability of concrete blocks formed 
by contraction joints and cracks along lift elevations; that is, con-
crete blocks close to the crest in the center of dams experience 
the highest absolute acceleration response.
We can conclude that, after a strong earthquake, the bottom 
outlet(s) and the spillway gates are operable, so a moderate flood 
can be released safely. It has to be assumed that the power plant 
will be shut down and water cannot be released through the 
power waterways. To control the water level in the reservoir after 
a strong earthquake, not all the openings of a spillway have to be 
functional.
5. Seismic safety and risk classification of dams 
5.1. Integral dam safety concept 
The two main goals of every safety concept are the minimi-
zation of all risks, and the mastering of the remaining risk in the 
best possible way. To reach these goals, a comprehensive safety 
concept is used for large storage dams, which includes the follow-
ing key elements: 
•	Structural safety (main elements: geologic, hydraulic, and 
seismic design criteria; design criteria and methods of 
analysis may have to be updated when new data are available 
or new guidelines, regulations, or codes are introduced);
•	Dam safety monitoring (main elements: dam instrumentation, 
periodic safety assessments by dam experts, etc.);
•	Operational safety (main elements: reliable rule curves for res e-
rvoir operation under normal and extraordinary [hydrological] 
conditions, training of personnel, dam maintenance, sediment 
f lushing, and engineering back-up; the most important 
element for a long service life is the maintenance of all 
structures and components); and
•	Emergency planning (main elements: emergency action 
plans, inundation maps, water alarm systems, evacuation 
plans, etc.).
Therefore, as long as the proper implementation of these safe-
ty issues can be guaranteed according to this integral safety con-
cept, a dam can be considered to be safe.
Periodic safety assessments are indispensable because they 
will show what measures have to be taken to maintain or im-
prove safety and thus to even extend the life span. Deficiencies 
observed after commissioning must be rectified as early as pos-
sible. A detailed description of the different dam safety elements 
can be found in Ref. [9].
If a dam does not comply with current dam safety standards 
or shows unusual behavior, the most effective means of reducing 
the risk is lowering the reservoir level.
It must be pointed out that both new and existing large stor-
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age dams must satisfy today’s safety criteria, which are the same 
for new and existing dams. Therefore, a risk-based approach in 
which the remaining service life is taken into account cannot be 
recommended. In conclusion, there shall be no difference in the 
safety of the people living downstream of a new or an old dam. 
This implies that safety upgrades cannot be postponed.
5.2. Emergency planning
As emergency planning is still rather a new feature in the dam 
industry in many countries, some additional discussion is provid-
ed here. In the emergency planning concept, it is assumed that 
every dam can fail or be destroyed—an assumption that is diffi-
cult for designers, owners, and authorities to accept. Therefore, 
the consequences of a dam failure, which is a flood wave caused 
by the uncontrolled release of the water from the reservoir, must 
be analyzed.
Numerous dam failure scenarios could be considered; how-
ever, the main objective of emergency planning is to save lives. 
Therefore, in order to prepare for alerting and evacuating people, 
it is necessary to focus on the worst scenarios with the greatest 
consequences. No failure probabilities are considered for these 
scenarios. The worst scenario is the instantaneous failure of a 
dam with a full reservoir, which may be due to military action. 
In an emergency situation, the dam owner is responsible 
for monitoring, determining appropriate alarm levels, making 
notifications, implementing emergency actions at the dam, de-
termining when an emergency situation no longer exists, and 
documenting all activities. In the case of an emergency, the dam 
owner is responsible for the immediate notification of the author-
ities, who are in charge of warning and evacuating the affected 
population.
Warning is performed by special water alarm systems. The 
basis for evacuation planning is a dam breach flood wave anal-
ysis, which shows the inundated area for the worst-case failure 
scenario, that is, the sudden failure of the dam. In addition, the 
arrival time of the flood wave, flow velocities, and water depth 
are results obtained from such an analysis.
In Switzerland, 65 large dams are equipped with a fully func-
tional water alarm system. The first alarm systems were installed 
over 50 years ago. Fortunately, to date, these water alarm systems 
have never had to be used.
5.3. Risk classification of dams
What is a large dam? Although this may seem to be a trivial 
question, in fact there is no universal answer when it comes to 
the (risk) classification of dams. For example, ICOLD categorizes a 
large dam as a storage dam with a height of at least 15 m. In China, 
dams are classified according to reservoir volume, with Class 1 
having a reservoir of more than 1000 Mm3, Class 2 having a reser-
voir between 100 Mm3 and 1000 Mm3, Class 3 having a reservoir 
of less than 100 Mm3, and so on. In Switzerland, dam classifica-
tion is standardized by laws and regulations, and dams with a 
height of at least 10 m and a reservoir volume of over 1 Mm3 fall 
into the highest risk class. Other definitions are used by other 
dam authorities, organizations, and owners. Accordingly, of the 
160 large dams within the highest risk category in Switzerland, 
only 12 would be in Class 2 in China, and the majority would be 
classified as Class 3 or even below.
The risk classification of dams has far-reaching implications 
on the (seismic) design criteria, performance criteria, and other 
design requirements given in codes and regulations. Therefore, in 
the assessment of the seismic safety of dams in different coun-
tries and with different owners, it is necessary to first examine 
the risk classification of the dam. 
Acceptable risk is the main issue in risk classification. A pre-
requisite of any quantitative risk analysis is the calculation of the 
probability of failure of a dam. As each dam is a prototype, this 
calculation can only be done approximately and with great nu-
merical effort, including numerous sensitivity analyses. Because 
of such difficulties, it is more straightforward to focus on the 
minimization of the possible consequences of a flood wave, as is 
done, for example, in Switzerland.
In conclusion, the risk classification of dams is an unresolved 
issue as differences may be very large among different countries 
and owners.
6. Sustainability of dams
A sustainable dam project is based on the following items: 
① dam safety, ② environmental aspects, ③ economic aspects, 
and ④ social aspects. A storage dam is an infrastructure project 
that must provide benefits to its stakeholders (food production, 
electricity, water supply, flood protection, aquaculture, recreation, 
navigation, etc.) [8]. 
Technical safety is the decisive characteristic of any technolo-
gy: Any technology that is unsafe has no future. Dams have been 
built for more than 2000 years, and some old dams are still in 
operation. The main prerequisite for the sustainability of dams is 
dam safety. Although the non-technical features of the dam ②−④ 
are also important, they can only be considered if the safety of the 
dam is guaranteed. For this reason, in the design and construction 
of a sustainable (multipurpose) dam, the project manager must 
be a dam or civil engineer and not a person with inadequate tech-
nical background and experience.
The artificial lakes created by dams must be properly managed, 
and dams need continuous maintenance. Many large reservoirs 
are used for energy production and flood protection. However, in 
future, reservoirs will become a more valuable source of water 
supply for the population and industry. Hence, the need for dams 
and reservoirs will persist. The requirements for sustainability 
and safety will remain for all dams, regardless of their particular 
use.
Private owners and developers of infrastructure projects use 
the concession period as a guideline for the design life of their 
dam project. For hydropower projects in Switzerland, for exam-
ple, the concession period is 80 years, while in other countries, 
the concession period may be as short as 30 years. The holder of 
a dam concession will try to design all structures and equipment 
to fit the concession period. When the concession period has ex-
pired, the ownership of the project is usually transferred to the 
government. Therefore, the authorities who grant the concession 
and who will own the project at the end of the concession period 
must have a keen interest in obtaining a dam that can be used for 
many more years in the future. 
Moreover, costs for the decommissioning of a dam are usual-
ly ignored and have to be borne by the future owner. Therefore, 
the government should specify that the dam design shall comply 
with international guidelines as published, for example, by ICOLD. 
The electromechanical equipment and control installations may 
be the only elements that have to be replaced at the end of the 
concession period. Thus, for a sustainable dam project, the dam 
body, safety-relevant elements, and other components should be 
designed for a long service life irrespective of the duration of the 
concession period. Hence, the final owner of a dam project must 
consider such issues at the time of the award of the concession.
The life span of any dam lasts as long as the dam is technically 
safe and operable. In view of the high damage potential of large 
storage dams, safety must be assessed based on an integral safety 
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concept, as discussed in Section 4.1.
In general, if a dam and its safety-relevant elements (bottom 
outlets, spillways) are properly maintained and the aging pro-
cesses can be controlled, the condition of a dam can be preserved. 
Thus, the life span of a dam lasts as long as proper maintenance 
can be ensured, which could be several hundred years.
A serious process affecting the service life of a reservoir is sed-
imentation. Proper sediment management strategies, which must 
be based on detailed studies of the river flow, sediment transport, 
watershed characteristics, sediment flushing devices, and so 
forth, can make reservoir siltation sustainable.
7. Seismic safety of existing dams 
Large dams were some of the first structures to be systemat-
ically designed against earthquakes, starting in the 1930s. How-
ever, the seismic safety of older dams is unknown, as most were 
designed using seismic design criteria and methods of analysis 
that are considered obsolete today. Therefore, it is necessary to 
reevaluate the seismic safety of existing dams, using current seis-
mic design criteria and modern methods of dynamic analyses, 
and to rehabilitate deficient dams.
The seismic safety aspects of existing dams is an important 
issue, as most dam codes, regulations, recommendations, and 
guidelines are primarily concerned with the design of new dams 
[7]. The design of a dam that was considered safe when it was 
commissioned may not remain safe forever. This fact may be 
contradictory to the general opinion of the owners and users of 
most dam structures. As earthquake engineering is still a rela-
tively young discipline, design criteria, methods of analysis, de-
sign concepts, and so forth may be subject to changes, especially 
if a large dam that was designed according to the current state-
of-practice should be damaged during an earthquake. Thus, 
there is a need for periodic checks of seismic design criteria and 
the earthquake safety of large dams (and other structures as 
well); that is, budgets for periodic seismic safety checks must be 
considered. 
In general, dam owners and operators are reluctant to perform 
such checks unless there are laws and regulations and a dam safe-
ty organization with the authority and means to ensure that the 
rules are followed. A thorough assessment of the design criteria 
is usually done when dam owners are applying for a new conces-
sion for their project. 
Again, the perception that a dam that was considered safe once 
will remain safe forever is a dangerous misconception. Therefore, 
several seismic safety assessments will be needed during the long 
service life of a dam. 
To date, only an 18.5 m high embankment dam has failed dur-
ing an earthquake, an event that occurred during the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake in Japan, where eight people lost their lives in a flood 
wave caused by dam failure. This may give the impression that 
well-designed dams are safe against earthquakes. Nevertheless, 
it is necessary to reevaluate the seismic safety of existing dams 
based on current state-of-the-art practices and rehabilitate ex-
isting dams if necessary. As a prerequisite, the seismic hazard at 
dam sites must be reassessed to comply with the current seismic 
design criteria.
It has been this author’s concern to look into the seismic safe-
ty of existing dams since he took over the chairmanship of the 
ICOLD Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design in 1999. 
Since then, several countries have been motivated to look into the 
seismic safety of existing dams. Through a comprehensive seis-
mic safety review of large dams in California in the 1990s, it was 
found that 116 dams needed seismic improvements, including the 
control (lowering) of the reservoir level. In Switzerland, a seismic 
safety evaluation of all large dams under government control 
was carried out by the dam owners. The safety reports were sub-
mitted before the end of 2013. The average age of the dams was 
65 years and most were designed against earthquakes using a 
seismic coefficient of 0.1 and a pseudo-static analysis method. For 
this seismic safety check, the government authorities allocated a 
period of 10 years; however, most reports were only completed 
shortly before the given deadline. 
It is strongly recommended by ICOLD’s seismic committee that 
such seismic safety checks of older dams be carried out world-
wide. 
8. Conclusions
In the seismic design and seismic safety assessment of dams, 
the following items are of main concern:
(1) Seismic hazard is a multi-hazard for most dam projects. 
Ground shaking is the main hazard considered in all earthquake 
guidelines for dams. However, rockfalls and fault movements 
could be more critical than ground shaking.
(2) Movements of active faults in the footprint of a dam, or 
movements at discontinuities (faults, joints, and bedding planes), 
which can be activated during strong nearby earthquakes, are the 
most critical seismic hazard for concrete dams. If no other site 
can be selected, then a conservatively designed earth core rockfill 
dam with wide filter and transition zones would be the best solu-
tion.
(3) Today, the seismic safety of a large storage dam includes 
the following safety elements: ① structural safety, ② dam safety 
monitoring, ③ operational safety and maintenance, and ④ emer-
gency planning. All items are equally important.
(4) Dams are not inherently safe against earthquakes. Howev-
er, technology is available for designing and building dams and 
appurtenant structures that can safely resist the effects of strong 
ground shaking.
(5) The earthquake load case has evolved as the critical load 
case for most large dams. Since safety is the main prerequisite for 
sustainability, managing the various safety aspects of the earth-
quake (and flood) hazard is a basic requirement for sustainable 
dams.
(6) The assumption that a civil structure that is safe at the 
time of construction remains safe during its whole service life is 
not realistic. During the life span of a dam, several seismic safety 
assessments will be needed if new information on the seismic 
hazard becomes available, when new design and safety criteria 
are introduced, if the seismic risk increases due to development 
in the downstream valley, and so forth.
(7) Keeping a dam in a safe condition requires proper mainte-
nance of the equipment and installations as well as the civil struc-
tures. Civil maintenance is given less attention than maintenance 
of the power plant facilities because the benefit of the latter can 
be expressed directly in terms of kW·h whereas civil maintenance 
and dam safety do not create a visible benefit. Therefore, a proper 
balance is needed.
(8) Hardly any observational data is available on the dynamic 
behavior of new types of dams (concrete face rockfill dams, as-
phalt core dams, embankment dams with upstream membranes, 
roller-compacted concrete (RCC) dams, etc.) and very high dams 
subjected to strong earthquakes.
(9) The gates of spillways and bottom outlets must be opera-
tional after a strong earthquake in order to control and lower the 
reservoir level. The seismic design criteria for these gate systems 
are the same as those for the dam body; however, the perfor-
mance criteria must be strict in order to guarantee the function-
ality of the gates after an earthquake. The designers and suppliers 
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of these gate systems are not yet familiar with these seismic safe-
ty requirements.
For the seismic analysis, design, and safety assessment of a 
dam, the following information is needed from earth scientists:
•	The existence of active faults or discontinuities in the foot-
print of the dam, which could be reactivated during strong 
earthquakes, and the maximum possible movement;
•	Specification of worst-case earthquake scenarios for the dam 
site (fault, location, focal depth, source mechanism, upper 
bound magnitude, and maximum fault movement);
•	Identification of slopes at the dam site and in the reservoir 
region that could fail or move during strong earthquakes; 
and
•	Acceleration time histories, as input for the inelastic seismic 
analysis of the dam. These idealized time histories represent 
load models, which have little in common with recorded ac-
celeration time histories.
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